Volume 82
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 82,
1977-1978
3-1-1978

Injunctions Restraining Employers Pending Arbitration: Equity and
Labor Policy
Robert A. Gallagher

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Robert A. Gallagher, Injunctions Restraining Employers Pending Arbitration: Equity and Labor Policy, 82
DICK. L. REV. 487 (1978).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol82/iss3/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Injunctions Restraining Employers
Pending Arbitration: Equity and
Labor Policy
I.

Introduction

Grievance resolution through binding arbitration is initiated by an
employee and/or the union filing a grievance protesting that some action
taken by the employer is in violation of the letter or spirit of the collective
bargaining agreement. If the controversy is not resolved through the
intermediate steps and procedures established by the agreement, the

grievance proceeds to arbitration. The contract is interpreted and the
dispute is finally settled by an arbitrator chosen by consensus of the union
and management.' The arbitrator will either sustain the grievance and

fashion a remedy for the employer's breach or dismiss the grievance
2
altogether.
Generally, an employer's implementation of a managerial decision
adversely affecting employees, such as lay-offs, work assignments, or
operation transfers has been subject only to post-hoc review through
arbitration to determine if management's action contravenes any provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. Increasingly, however,
unions have sought injunctive relief to stay the implementation of managerial decisions that allegedly breach the labor agreement. 3 Courts faced
with actions to enjoin employers have utilized various approaches for
determining the propriety of such relief. Because application of traditional equity requirements is influenced by both judicial and statutory expres1. This discussion is necessarily general in nature. The grievance-arbitration procedures will vary with the collective bargaining agreement. "No obligation to arbitrate a labor
dispute arises solely by operation of law. " Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 374
(1974). A dispute may be arbitrated in the absence of a contractually mandated arbitration
procedure by means of a "submission agreement" between the parties. See generally F.
ELKOURI & E.A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 181-86 (3d ed. 1974); M. TROlTA,
ARBITRATION OF LABOR MANAGEMENT DISPUTES 26-35, 36-43, 51-52, 83 (1974).

2.

In some cases an arbitration panel is selected to resolve contract disputes. See

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION VOLUNTARY LABOR ARBITRATION RULES (June 1,

1975). An arbitration panel usually consists of one arbitrator appointed by the union, one
appointed by the employer, and a third chosen by agreement .of the two party-appointed
arbitrators.
3. Union actions for status quo injunctions are the exception rather than the rule. A
suit for an injunction by a union has been deemed an "aggressive action" that "would be the
union equivalent of the employer's request. . for injunctive relief against a strike pending
determination by arbitration of the underlying dispute." Simon, Union Litigation, in BASIC
LABOR RELATIONS 109, at 123 (B. Pogrebin ed. 1976).

sions of labor policy, the law in this area is a patchwork of ambiguous and
often anomalous decisions that have failed to articulate clear or systematic standards governing the issuance of injunctive relief.
This comment will explore the considerations that courts have examined in deciding whether to issue injunctive relief to restrain an
employer and preserve the status quo pending arbitral resolution of a
labor dispute. It focuses on the methodology of the federal courts applying equity standards, the contractual quidpro quo analysis adopted by the
Ninth Circuit, and the traditional equity approach utilized by the state
courts in public employer-employee cases. To a degree these approaches
overlap. Nevertheless, they are analytically distinct and rest on dissimilar
assumptions concerning the need for judicial intervention in labor-management disputes. A familiarity with the statutes and cases that have
influenced decisions in this area is essential to an understanding of the
present state of the law.
II.
A.

Arbitration and Labor Policy
Arbitration:A Favored Dispute Resolution Mechanism

It is beyond dispute that arbitration has been accorded a favored
position in national labor policy. Federal labor legislation demonstrates
the congressional preference for private dispute settlement mechanisms.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act,4 although primarily concerned with restricting the issuance of injunctive relief by federal courts,5 expresses a
preference for labor dispute settlement through arbitration.6 This preference was more forcefully articulated in the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley).' In a number of decisions the Supreme Court
has sought to effectuate this congressional policy. The Court in Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama' rejected the common-law
rule against enforcing agreements to arbitrate and concluded that section
301 of Taft-Hartley9 mandates both the enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate and the' development of a substantive federal labor law.10 It
4. 29 U.S.C. §§101-115(1970).
5. The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed in 1932 to restrict the ability of the federal
courts to issue injunctions against concerted activity in labor disputes. The classic study on
the use of injunctive relief to stifle unions and concerted employee activity in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century is F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION (1930).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1970) provides in part, "No restraining order or injunctive relief

shall be granted any complainant who has . . . failed to take every reasonable effort to
settle such dispute. . . with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation
or voluntary arbitration."
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970). "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising
over the application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement." Id. at
§ 173(d).
8. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
10. 353 U.S. at 456.

found that the congressional policy favoring arbitration justified the
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate without obstruction from the
requirements of section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia.11
The policy favoring the arbitration of labor disputes was firmly
established in the landmark Steelworkers trilogy comprising two actions
to compel an employer to arbitrate disputes' 2 and a third to enforce an
arbitrator's award. 13 According to the trilogy directives, the federal courts
may not refuse to issue an order to arbitrate unless the court can state
"with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of
an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."' 4 An arbitrator's
award must be enforced unless it fails to draw its "essence" from the

labor agreement, but enforcement cannot be denied merely because a
court's "interpretation of the contract is different from [the
arbitrator's]. "15

B.

The Quid Pro Quo Analysis and Boys Markets Injunctions
Beginning with Lincoln Mills and continuing through the Steelworkers trilogy, the Court conceptualized an arbitration agreement as the
quid pro quo for the no-strike provision of a labor agreement. 6 It held in
a suit for damages resulting from a strike that a contractual commitment
to submit disputes to final and binding arbitration gave rise to an implied
obligation not to strike.' 7 Injunctions, however, remained barred by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. 18

The Supreme Court sought to accommodate the Norris-LaGuardia
restrictions on the grant of injunctive relief and the national policy
favoring the arbitration of labor disputes in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Union, Local 770.1' In a carefully limited holding, the Court
11. Id. at 458-59. See 29 U.S.C. § 107(1970). The Court reasoned that "[t]he failure to
arbitrate was not a part and parcel of the abuses against which the Act was aimed." 353 U.S.
at 458. See note 5 supra. The practical significance of this was to increase the availability of
court orders to arbitrate by removing procedural barriers to specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate disputes, despite the similarity of such orders to injunctions.
12. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
13. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
14. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960). "Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage." Id. at 583.
15. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960).
16. "Plainly the agreement to arbitrate disputes is the quid pro quo for an agreement
not to strike." Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). "There is
no exception in the 'no strike' clause and none therefore should be read into the grievance
clause, since one is the quid pro quo for the other." United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
17. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
18. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
19. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
20. "Our holding ... is a narrow one. We do not undermine the vitality of the NorrisLaGuardia Act . . . . Nor does it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is
appropriate as a matter of course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable grievance." Id.
at 253-54.

stated that a strike, in breach of a labor contract and over a dispute that

both parties were contractually bound to arbitrate, was enjoinable. The
21
Court, in reconciling the anti-injunction provisions of Norris-LaGuardia
with the policy favoring arbitration over other self-help measures, adopted guidelines22 to govern the issuance of injunctive relief.
The arbitration policy rationale was reiterated in Buffalo Forge Co.
v. United Steelworkers of America ,23 in which the Court restricted employer access to injunctive relief in federal courts. Buffalo Forge resolved
a split among the circuits by stressing that a sympathy strike was not
24
enjoinable under the Boys Markets exception to Norris-LaGuardia.
Since the disputes underlying sympathy strikes are not capable of resolu25
tion through arbitration procedures, Boys Markets does not apply.
The majority of actions brought by unions to enjoin employers
pending arbitration have arisen after the Boys Markets decision. 26 Feder21. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
22. The principles adopted in Boys Markets were those formulated in the dissenting
opinion in Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962):
A -District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not grant injunctive
relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the case is one in
which an injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When
a strike is sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both parties
are contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no injunctive
order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect; and the employer
should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against
the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider whether
issuance of an injunction would be warranted under ordinary principles of equitywhether breaches are occurring and will continue, or have been threatened and will
be committed; whether they have caused or will cause irreparable injury to the
employer; and whether the employer will suffer more from the denial of an
injunction than will the union from its issuance.
398 U.S. at 254 (emphasis in original).
23. 428 U.S. 397 (1976)., "The driving force behind Boys Markets was to implement
the strong congressional preference for the private dispute settlement mechanisms agreed
upon by the parties." Id. at 407.
24. The circuits were split over whether a strike allegedly in breach of a no-strike
provision of the agreement in itself presented an arbitrable grievance for the purposes of a
Boys Markets injunction or whether the dispute underlying the strike had to be an arbitrable
grievance for an injunction to issue. See Rains, Boys Markets Injunctions: Strict Scrutiny of
the Presumption of Arbitrability, 28 LAB. L.J. 30 (1977).
The majority in Buffalo Forge believed that the Boys Markets decision was concerned
primarily with effectuating agreements to arbitrate. The four dissenting Justices interpreted
Boys Markets as a case dealing essentially with the enforcement of no-strike provisions in
labor agreements. Hence, notwithstanding that sympathy strikes cannot be resolved through
the arbitral process and despite the arbitration policy rationale underlying the exception to
the Norris-LaGuardia restriction on injunctive relief, the dissent thought that a Boys
Markets injunction was appropriate. See Curtin, Buffalo Forge and the Union'sNo-Strike
Commitment: A Management Perspective, 23rd ANN. I sT. LAB. L. Sw. LEGAL FOUNDAlION 57, 69-70, 81 (1977).

25. The Court in Buffalo Forge, which was obviously hesitant to increase access to
injunctive relief, relied on the anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia and noted, "This
would . . . make the courts potential participants in a wide range of arbitrable disputes
under the many existing and future collective bargaining contracts .... " 428 U.S. at 41011(footnote omitted). Judicial intervention in labor-management disputes was proper only
"for the purpose of enforcing promises to arbitrate, which was the limit of Boys Markets
... .Id. at 411.
26. It has been argued that injunctions should be as accessible to unions seeking to
restrain the implementation of a managerial decision pending arbitration under Boys Mar-

al courts have drawn on both the labor policy articulated in the line of
decisions from Lincoln Mills through Buffalo Forge and traditional

equity criteria in determining the propriety of issuing injunctive relief.
III. The Interplay of Equity and the Policy Favoring Arbitration
A. General Principlesof Equity
27
Equity has traditionally been cautious in granting injunctive relief.
"The preliminary injunction is an extraordinary tool of the courts wherein
a party [to a dispute]-at the behest of his intagonist-is forbidden by the
court to engage in designated conduct prior to any final determination
that such conduct ought to be proscribed. "28
General standards have evolved that safeguard against the improvident issuance of injunctive relief and also allow a degree of latitude and

flexibility in the exercise of judicial discretion. These equitable principles
require a party seeking injunctive relief to establish the following elements: (1) that there is a probable, 29 a reasonable, 30 or some 3' likelihood
of success in ultimately prevailing on the merits of the claim;3 2 (2) that
without such relief it would suffer irreparable harm for which there is no
adequate remedy; 33 and (3) that the balance of hardships, 34 injuries, 35 or
equities 36 tips in its favor.
Regardless of whether they find that their authority to issue status

quo injunctions sought by unions arises under the Boys Markets decision
kets as they are for employers seeking to enjoin strikes. Simon, InjunctiveReliefto Maintain
the Status Quo Pending Arbitration: A Union Practitioner'sView, 29th ANN. N.Y.U. CONF.
LAB. 317 (1976). Cf. Gentile, Injunctive Relief: An Old Remedy Rejuvenated, 25th ANN.
N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 143, 161 (1972) ("The potential use by unions of Boys Markets does not
appear great. It lies principally in the area of employer lockouts, department terminations
and other-similar activities").
The cases arising prior to Boys Markets have relied on the Lincoln Mills decision and
have interpreted the power to compel specific performance of an arbitration provision to
include the authority to enjoin employers pending arbitration. E.g., Local 1098, Ass'n of
Street Coach Employees v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, 225 F. Supp. 28 (D.D.C. 1963).
27. "There is no power the exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater
caution, deliberation, and sound discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case ....
W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1431 (C. Wright ed.

1958) (quoting Judge Baldwin in Bonaparte v. Camden, F. Cas. No. 1617 (C.C.N.J. 1830)).
28. Metzger & Friedlander, The PreliminaryInjunction: Injury Without Remedy?, 29
Bus. LAW. 913 (1974).
29. Id. at 917.
30. Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 9 v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 343 F. Supp.
55, 56 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1973).
31. Hoh v. Pepsico, 491 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1974).
32. This is sometimes referred to as a ".clear right to relief." E.g., Berkowitz v.
Wilbar, 416 Pa. 369, 373, 206 A.2d 280, 282 (1965).
33. See Nussbaum, Temporary RestrainingOrdersand PreliminaryInjunctions-The
FederalPractice, 26 Sw. L.J. 265, 273-74 (1972).
34. Hoh v. Pepsico, 491 F.2d 556, 562 (2d Cir. 1974).
35. Section 7(c) of the Norris-LaGuardia Act phrases this equity criterion in terms of a
balancing of the injuries, providing in part that a court must find "as to each item of relief
granted greater injury will be inflicted upon complainant by the denial of relief than will be
inflicted upon defendants by the granting of relief." 29 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1970).
36. E.g., Local 174, Util. Workers Union V. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 345 F.
Supp. 52, 53 (W.D. Pa. 1972).

or the Lincoln Mills decision, 37 federal courts have generally invoked
these traditional equity criteria. The application of these principles has
been influenced by the court's conception of the policy favoring arbitration and its applicability to actions to enjoin employers. The extent to
which the policy directives enunciated by the Supreme Court in the
Steelworkers trilogy should be extended to union actions for preliminary
injunctions and the degree to which the relatively restrictive equity
standards must consequently be modified is unclear. The problem is best
evaluated by analyzing the attempts of courts to accommodate these two
considerations.
B.

Some Likelihood of Success on the Merits
In Hoh v. Pepsico, 3 the union sought to enjoin the permanent

shutdown of a brewery pending arbitration of the union's claim that this
was not permissible until the collective bargaining agreement had expired. 39 The Second Circuit, in affirming the lower court's denial of a
preliminary injunction, required a showing of some likelihood of success
in obtaining the arbitral award in aid of which the injunction was
sought.' The Steelworkers trilogy directive that agreements to arbitrate
should be liberally construed 4 did not, in the court's opinion, extend to
cases in which ancillary relief was sought.42 An arguably arbitrable
claim, which would be sufficient for an order compelling arbitration, was
deemed an insufficient basis for a preliminary injunction pending arbitration .41
37. These suits are brought under § 301 of Taft-Hartley, 29 U.S.C. 185(a). See notes 810 and accompanying text supra.
38. 491 F.2d 556 (2d Cii. 1974).
39. The union alleged that the shutdown violated the anti-lockout provisions of the
agreement. The employer relied upon a clause permitting it to suspend or discontinue
operations. Id. at 561-62.
40. Th court considered the "ordinary principles of equity" guideline of Boys Markets to include "some likelihood of success." Id. at 561. See note 22 supra. See Communications Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 430 F. Supp. 969, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), for a
formulation of guidelines based on the "combined teaching of Boys Markets and Hoh v.
Pepsico."
The courts constituting the Second Circuit have uniformly imposed this equity safeguard. See Communications Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 430 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Distillery Workers Union, Local I v. Hiram Walker, Inc., 88 L.R.R.M. 3127
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mer., 90 L.R.R.M. 2889 (2d Cir. 1975); Rochester Independent Workers,
Local I v. General Dynamics Corp., 76 L.R.R.M. 2540 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
Other courts have also required this safeguard, e.g., Newspaper Printing Pressmen's
Union No. 9 v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 343 F. Supp. 55 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 607
(3d Cir. 1973); United Steelworkers v. Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach. Inc., 319 F. Supp.
636 (W.D. Pa. 1970); cf. Electrical, Radio, & Mach. Workers Union, Local 103 v. Radio
Corp. of America, 77 L.R.R.M. 2201,2203 (D.N.J. 1971) ("good likelihood of prevailing" in
the arbitration proceeding).
41. In the Steelworkers trilogy, the Supreme Court established a presumption of
arbitrability in actions to compel arbitration. See note 14 and accompanying text supra. See
also note 46 infra.
42. 491 F.2d at 561.
43. "It would be inequitable in the last degree to grant an injunction pending arbitration which was costly to a defendant on the basis of a claim which although arguably
arbitrable was plainly without merit." Id.

Both the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits reject the Hoh requirement of
a showing of both some likelihood of success and an arguably arbitrable
claim. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that 'the emphasis on the importance of
arbitration to stable labor-management relations expressed in the Steelworkers decisions justified removing the barrier to injunctive relief effected in Hoh 4 and requiring only an arbitrable dispute. 45 The Fourth
Circuit concurred with the Ninth, apparently on the ground that the
interpretation of the labor agreement was within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the arbitrator.' Underlying this approach is the logic that since courts
can construe only the arbitration clause of the collective agreement in
determining whether a dispute is arbitrable, the consideration of a probability of success in compelling arbitration would be superfluous 47 and any

consideration of the merits, once an arbitrable dispute is established,
would be improper. 48

A tension exists between the Steelworkers directive not to interpret
the collective bargaining agreement 49 and the traditional caution of equity
in granting injunctive relief. A strong argument can be made that this
directive, which applies to suits brought to compel arbitration, is inapplicable to a suit to restrain an employer pending arbitration. 51 Compelling
44. See Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d 1073, 1077-78
(9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976).
45. In holding the principles of Boys Markets applicable when a union is seeking an
injunction to maintain the status quo pending arbitration, the court stated, "If there is a
genuine dispute with respect to an arbitrable issue, the barrier we believe appropriate has
been cleared." Id. at 1078.
46. Lever Bros. Co. v. Chemical Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir.
1976). Requiring a showing of some likelihood of success at arbitration poses theoretical
difficulties with the caveat in the Steelworkers trilogy that the merits of a contractual dispute
are solely for the arbitrator's determination. In United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 567-78 (1960), the Court stated,
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all
questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is
governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question
of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving
party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment . . . that was bargained for.

The Court, in another trilogy case, United Steelworkers V. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363
U.S. 574, 585 (1960) (action to compel arbitration), stated, "[T]he court should view with
suspicion an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the construction of the substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even through the back door of interpreting the
arbitration clause...
" See also Note, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV.
56, 255 (1976): "[T]he lasting significance of Buffalo Forge may be chiefly as a limit to the
Boys Markets doctrine and as a signal to federal judges to stay out of the merits of labor
disputes."
47. But see Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. National Tea Co., 346 F. Supp. 875,
881 (W.D. Pa.), remanded, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1972): "'[P]laintiffs are likely to succeed in
their contention that all disputes under this contract including all or some of the claims now
made by them are subject to arbitration."
48. See note 46 supra.
49. Courts have broadly applied the Steelworkers caveat not to interpret the collective
bargaining agreement to union actions for injunctions pending arbitration. E.g., Technical,
Office & Prof. Workers Union, Local 757 v. Budd Co., 345 F. Supp. 42,45 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
50. It has been stated that the presumption of arbitrability should not be applied when
an employer seeks to enjoin a strike under Boys Markets since this presumption does not

an employer to arbitrate is unlikely to have any harsh effects and only
enforces the promise to arbitrate disputes-including the dispute whether
the underlying grievance is subject to arbitration in the first place. This
rationale does not necessarily apply when an arguably arbitrable grievance is presented as a basis for an injunction restraining an employer
pending arbitration. 5 A court's limited consideration of the merits when
a preliminary injunction is sought would not be dispositive of the underlying grievance, 52 nor would it be likely to affect the arbitrator's determination whether the employer has complied with the labor agreement. 5 In
sum, requiring a showing of some likelihood of success before issuing
injunctive relief does not threaten to deprive a union of its benefit of the
bargain secured by an arbitration agreement as it would when a court
considers the merits of a dispute in a suit to compel arbitration. 5 4 Arguably, eschewing inquiry into the merits of the dispute encourages spuri55
ous suits.
adequately protect the policy of judicial non-intervention in labor disputes inherent in the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. Axelrod, The Application of the Boys Markets Decision in the
Federal Courts, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 893, 918-19 (1975).
Apparently the application of the presumption of arbitrability does not adequately
protect an employer from wrongful restraint either. See Local 13, Fed'n of Prof. & Tech.
Engineers v. General Elec. Co., 531 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir. 1976), revg 90 L.R.R.M. 2566 (E.D.
Pa. 1975).
51. Generally, the arbitration of the dispute has already begun or is pending when the
injunction is sought by the union. The delay occasioned by the grant of a preliminary
injunction could effectively deprive management of the benefits it sought to achieve by the
enjoined action and hamper its ability to respond to external business conditions (e.g., a layoff in response to diminished orders from purchasers or an inability to procure materials).
52. The merits are considered solely for the purpose of determining the propriety of
issuing preliminary injunctive relief. If an arguably arbitrable dispute was presented, it
could be arbitrated regardless of whether a preliminary injunction is granted. A conclusion
that the claim was seemingly frivolous would be only one consideration to balance in
deciding whether to enjoin the employer pending arbitration. It need not have any effect on
a court's decision to order an employer to arbitrate the dispute.
53. '[T]he arbitrator would ordinarily remain free to reconsider the ground covered
by the court insofar as it bore on the merits of the dispute, using the flexible approaches
familiar to arbitration." John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 558 (1964).
54. When a union seeks an order to compel arbitration, the court must grant the order
upon a finding that "the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is
governed by the contract." United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568
(1960). It was the arbitrator's construction that was bargained for, and the union risks losing
this benefit by a court's consideration of the merits in determining arbitrability.
55. Conceivably, with the presumption of arbitrability invoked by the federal courts,
injunctions could be sought on frivolous contractual claims. For example, an employer
might expressly reserve the right to terminate operations at any of its plants, expressly
excluding that decision from coverage under the arbitration provision. An allegation that the
termination was actually a "contracting out of work" since the work would be performed at
another of the employer's plants, or that it was a "lock-out" would, nevertheless, present
arbitrable grievances.
A consideration of the likelihood of success on the merits could screen out spurious
claims for injunctive relief without depriving the union of an arbitrator's construction of the
agreement. An order to arbitrate can still be granted. In Hoh, expedited arbitration of
similar claims made by four other unions resulted in a decision that the permanent closing of
the brewery did not violate a similar "no-lockout" clause. 491 F.2d at 561 n.9.

C.

IrreparableInjury
1.

The Amorphous Nature of Irreparable Harm.-The federal

courts agree that a showing of irreparable injury is a prerequisite for an
injunction pending arbitration. Their agreement is, however, only superficial, since courts differ about when harm becomes irreparable. Some

have held that this standard was satisfied even when an employer's action
could not reasonably pose a threat of irreparable injury.
The court in United Steelworkers v. Blaw-Knox Foundry56 encountered a situation in which actual irreparable injury to the employees was
likely had the employer not been enjoined. The employer intended to

reduce the size of the crews manning its open-hearth furnaces. The union
alleged that this manpower reduction contravened the health and safety

provisions of the labor agreement, and the employer conceded that there
was an increased likelihood of "runouts" of molten steel, which the
reduced complement would be less capable of remedying. In enjoining
the reductions, the court specifically mentioned that it was the safety
hazard, and not the loss of work, that provided the basis for a finding of
imminent irreparable harm if an injunction did not issue.57
A showing that some laid-off employees would lose their seniority
recall rights and, hence, their status as employees, should arbitration be
delayed, has also been considered sufficient proof of threatened irreparable injury. In Communications Workers v. Western Electric Co. 58 for
example, employees who would lose their recall rights under the agreement could not be made whole through an arbitration award if the union
59
prevailed on the merits and, thus, lacked an adequate arbitral remedy.
Other courts have equated a showing of the loss of jobs or wages
with irreparable injury and have automatically responded with the issuance of a preliminary injunction pending arbitration. 6° One court en56. 319 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
57. The court stated, "For any loss of work which may result from defendant's
action, plaintiffs have an adequate remedy before the arbitrator. . . . [T]o the extent that
defendant's action . . . threatens the health and safety of the employees..., there is no
Id. at 641.
adequate remedy . . . pending a decision by the arbitrator .
58. 430 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
59. Id. at 979. The court, however, found that irreparable injury was not imminent,
since expedited arbitration would resolve the underlying question of contractual construction before the loss of recall rights. Id. at 980.
60. The Blaw-Knox decision has been miscited as supporting the proposition that the
immediate loss of jobs and wages justifies the issuance of a preliminary injunction pending
arbitral resolution of the dispute. See Food Employees Union, Local 590 v. National Tea
Co., 346 F. Supp. 875, 882 (W.D. Pa.), remanded, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1972). Judge
Gourley clarified his Blaw-Knox decision in two subsequent cases that demonstrated this
construction is erroneous. In Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 9 v. Pittsburgh
Press Co., 343 F. Supp. 55, 56 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1973), he stated,
"Indeed, if any wages will be lost as a consequence of defendant's action in either case,
they can be recouped should the Unions receive a favorable award." Accord, Local 174,
Util. Workers Union v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 345 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Pa. 1972). See
also Rochester Independent Workers, Local 1 v. General Dyanmics Corp., 76 L.R.R.M.
2540, 2541 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).

joined an employer from subcontracting work normally performed by
members of the bargaining unit, even though none of the employees faced
immediate lay-off. 61 In the court's opinion, if the employees were relegated to their arbitral remedy, irreparable harm would result.62 According to this court's reasoning, the diminution of work opportunities
threatened lay-off, and the arbitral remedy for an improper lay-off was
inadequate. 63 Another court,' after concluding that the employer was
breaching its obligations under the collective bargaining agreement by
transferring work from one of its plants to another, 65 found that irreparable harm would result to the laid-off employees because of the unem66
ployment problem of the vicinity in which the plants were located.
Two cases involving the Postal Service dramatically illustrate the
convoluted reasoning engaged in by some courts to satisfy the irreparable
injury limitation. In one case, 67 the Postal Service intended to consolidate
and adjust letter carrier routes. The Letter Carriers Union alleged that this
was a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and the dispute
proceeded to arbitration. Finding that certain employees would be placed
on part-time status and others would be required to deliver more mail than
usual, the court concluded that there was a danger that irreparable injury
would result if the route consolidations became effective before it was
determined through arbitration that they were permissible. 68 Another
court found that the Postal Service's unilateral elimination of a ten-minute
washup period would result in irreparable harm to the affected employees
if an injunction did not issue. 69 The dispute over the propriety of the
61. Electrical, Radio, & Mach. Workers Union, Local 103 v. Radio Corp. of America,
77 L.R.R.M. 2201 (D.N.J. 1971).
62. Id. at 2204.
63. The court considered the effect of a loss of "on-payroll" status upon such rights
as pension and vacation credits, seniority, continuous service credits, accident and health
benefits, and jury duty coverage. Id. But see note 73 infra, discussing an arbitrator's ability
to make employees whole for losses occasioned by an employer's breach of the labor
agreement.

64.

Local 294, Elec., Radio, & Mach. Workers Union v. Three Rivers Indus., Inc., 78

L.R.R.M. 2090 (D. Mass. 1971).

65.

Id.

66.

Id. Although the court did not discuss the point, it is conceivable that employees

at the plant to which the work had been transferred might be laid-off because of the
injunction. Irreparable injury might have been inflicted on these employees by the-granting

of the injunction. They were not covered by the union's collective bargaining agreement
with the employer and, hence, would be unable to even invoke arbitration if they deemed

their lay-off improper.
67. Branch 998, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. United States Postal Serv., 88
L.R.R.M. 3524 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
68. Id. at 3525. There is no basis for the court's presumption that any employees

required to work beyond the normal eight-hour workday could not be adequately compensated through a favorable arbitration award. The arbitral remedy, should the employer be

found in breach of the agreement, is clear-compensation at an overtime rate of pay for the
additional time worked. Nor is there any basis for the court's presumption that any unjust
disciplinary measures imposed by the employer for an employee's unsatisfactory job performance could not be remedied through arbitration.
69. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, Branch 352 v. United States Postal Serv., 88
L.R.R.M. 2678 (S.D. Iowa 1975).

employer's action was being arbitrated pursuant to the agreement. The
court summarily discounted the adequacy of the arbitral remedy and
stated, "[T]here is a genuine question as to whether any monetary loss
suffered by the individual carrier by an elimination of the washup time
could be made whole through a favorable arbitration award.''70 Often a
strong emotive appeal accompanies actions in which an injunction to
restrain the implementation of a managerial decision is sought. 7 This ad
72
hominem consideration cannot be lightly dismissed.

Under an analysis that focuses on the loss of jobs, wages, or pure
speculations about the consequences of the employer's actions, it is
difficult to conceive of any managerial decision adversely affecting employees that would not satisfy an irreparable injury standard.73 Why this

requirement has not been applied meaningfully by some courts is not
clear from the decisions. Possibly the courts consider arbitration so
important to stable labor-management relations that all barriers to injunctive relief should be removed, even though an injunction would only
tangentially or indirectly promote the arbitration of labor disputes.

4

70. Id. at 2679. If the collective bargaining agreement provided for a differential for
overtime, the arbitral remedy for breach of the agreement is fairly clear: the payment of the
differential overtime rate for the eliminated ten minute washup period from the date of
elimination until the employer complied with the agreement.
71. See, e.g., Local Div. 1098, Ass'n Street Coach Employees v. Eastern Greyhound
Lines. 225 F. Supp. 28, 29 (D.D.C. 1963) (discussion of the likely effects upon the employees of an employer's transfer of operations).
72. One court, in considering the employer's reorganization of its corporate structure
that would have resulted in layoffs, stated, "Fourteen employees will be put out of work
which would cause a tremendous disruption in their personal lives and the personal lives of
their families. This is the type of harm which is irreparable." Technical, Office & Prof.
Workers Union, Local 757 v. Budd Co., 345 F. Supp. 42, 46 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In reference to
the employer's potential financial loss, the court stated, "This... is not a heavy stone on
the Company's side of the scale because the Company was not able to set out at the hearing
what economic losses it may suffer if the move were prevented or delayed, if any." Id.
Nevertheless, the short time span between when the action is instituted and when the
hearing is held on the motion for the preliminary injunction may make it difficult for an
employer to present specific proof of the amount of financial loss an injunction would
occasion. See, e.g., Technical, Office & Prof. Workers Union, Local 757 v. Budd Co., 345
F. Supp. 42, 45 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (hearing held the day afterthe suit was initiated); Local 103,
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers Union v. Radio Corp. of America, 77 L.R.R.M. 2201, 220 Z
(D.N.J. 1971).
73. Arbitrators, absent an express provision in the collective bargaining agreement
limiting their authority, award reinstatement, retroactive seniority, back pay, fringe benefits, and return of transferred work when such awards are necessary to remedy an employer's breach of the agreement and return the status quo. Arbitrator Edelman, in referring to a
union request that the employer be required to pay all "fringes" from the date of the
improper layoff until recall, stated, "[This] is reasonable, being no more than a part of the
provision that the grievants be made whole. If they had not been laid off those fringes paid
by the Employer would have continued .... " Hollander & Co., 64 Lab. Arb. & Disp.
Settl. 816, 821 (1975). Retroactive seniority is frequently granted. "The grievant is entitled
to full seniority rights that she would have had, had she not been terminated.
"T.R.W.
Inc., 64 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 589, 593 (1975) (Feldman, Arb.).
It has been noted that the courts have not applied a meaningful irreparable injury
standard in granting conditional relief restoring the status quo pending arbitration in actions
brought by employers to enjoin strikes. Axelrod, supra note 50, at 942-43.
74. Perhaps the court is seeking to defuse what it considers a potential strike situation
and avoid having the employer bring an action to enjoin the strike under Boys Markets.

Perhaps the finding of irreparable injury results from the courts' own
perception of the merits of the dispute. 71 Some courts might deem the
expectation interests engendered by one party's interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement judicially enforceable pending arbitration. The expectation interests of employees and/or the union,7 6 however,
can be more directly protected by judicial enforcement of arbitral awards
than by unnecessary judicial interference before arbitration.
Regardless of the reasons for the ready issuance of preliminary
injunctive relief, the effect of this practice is readily apparent: the arbitrator is deprived of his remedial powers. Should the union prevail in
arbitration after a preliminary injunction has issued, no arbitral remedy is
necessary since no breach of the agreement could have occurred,. Likewise, if the employer should prevail, the grievance would be dismissed,
and the only effect of the injunction would be to delay the implementation
of a contractually permissible managerial decision.
2. IrreparableInjury as a "Significant Requirement."--Treating
irreparable injury as a forgone conclusion after it has been established that
some employees will be adversely affected by managerial action removes
any safeguards the requirement might have against premature judicial
intervention. While the present conditions and terms of employment are
protected until an arbitrator renders a decision,77 apparently little or no
consideration is given to the long-term implications for management's
right to manage and its correlative responsibility for efficiently allocating
78
both human and material resources.
The Ninth Circuit, in Transit Union, Division 1384 v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc. ,79 was faced with an appeal from the grant of an injunction
"[U]nion defendants in Boys Markets type injunction cases have been able to secure, as the
'price' for the issuance of that injunction, an order against the employer enjoining the
implementation of whatever triggered the strike." Simon, supra note 3, at 120. A court

willing to grant conditional relief to a union defendant in a Boys Markets case without a
showing of imminent irreparable injury can thereby remove the need for the union to strike
to compel acceptance of its interpretation of the contract pending arbitration.
75. See, e.g., Local 294, Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers Union v. Three Rivers
Indus., 78 L.R.R.M. 2090 (D. Mass. 1971), in which the district judge stated, "[Tihe
company presently is not performing its obligations under the terms and provisions of this
collective bargaining agreement." Id.
76.

See Note, Protecting Intangible Expectations Under Collective Bargaining Agree-

ments-Overcomingthe Proscription ofArbitralPenalties, 61 MINN. L. REv. 127 (1976). The
commentator notes that "[e]mployees are ... interested in such intangible factors as job
security, working conditions, and vacation schedules. Finally, the union has a survival
interest in sustaining its reputation among the employees it represents." Id. at 134.

77. The implications of the ready availability on a large scale of injunctions to
preserve the last uncontested terms and conditions of employment are largely unknown,
although clearly the implementation of even contractually permissible managerial decisions
would be delayed. See Fairweather, The NLRB-Implementer of the NationalLaborPolicy
or Vice Versa?, 22 LAB. L.J. 294, 301 (1971).
78. The traditional equity requirements for injunctive relief have been justified in an
economic context because of their restrictive effect on governmental intervention. See
Metzger & Friedlander, supra note 28, at 917.
79. 529 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976).

restraining the employer from changing the existing work cycles of
employees to a straight work week of five days on, two days off, pending
arbitration. Despite its belief that the importance of arbitration justified
increased access to injunctions, 0 the court hesitated to remove all barriers
to injunctive relief. The court believed that if it treated "irreparable injury
as a significant requirement" 8' suits for injunctive relief would not
become a means to obtain judicially what could not be achieved through
the collective bargaining agreement. 82 The court in Greyhound thus
revealed a sensitivity for the collective bargaining process and an awareness that, while arbitration is "part and parcel of the collective bargaining
process, "83 the means for initially delimiting and defining the rights and
priorities of the parties is in the negotiation and formation of the labor
the finding of irreparable
agreement. Nevertheless, the court sustained
84
injunction.
the
of
issuance
the
injury and
A stringent irreparable injury requirement is not incompatible with
policy
favoring arbitration. This much was recognized by the Ninth
the
Circuit. No relationship between the irreparable injury analysis and the
arbitral process was developed, however. The focus in an irreparable
injury determination should be on the effect of the employer's action on
the arbitration process itself. Imminent irreparable injury should be found
only in the few circumstances in which the arbitral remedy for contractual
breaches is clearly inadequate or when the employer's implementation of
a managerial decision would render its promise to arbitrate disputes
illusory. Requiring inquiry into the impact of the employer's intended
conduct on the arbitration of the dispute might effectively constrain the
trial courts that are more enamoured by broad statements of policy than
by the adjuration "not to treat inconvenience to a few union members as
the irreparable injury required by ordinary principles of equity. "85 It
would prevent a transmutation of the policy of favoring labor dispute
arbitration. This policy does not require the issuance of injunctive relief
upon allegation of contractual breach.
The Balance of Hardships
1. Hardships Considered by the Courts.-Although an employer's action in proceeding on its interpretation of the contract may,
from a judicial perspective, threaten irreparable injury, a court will deny
injunctive relief when greater harm to the employer would result from its
issuance. The failure by a court to properly balance the equities can result
D.

80. See note 45 and accompanying text supra.
81. 529 F.2d at 1079.
82. "Maintenance of the status quo in all cases pending arbitration may be bargained
for by the union and agreed to by the employer. Its equivalent should not be derived from
Boys Markets." Id.
83. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navig. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
84. 529 F.2d at 1078-79.
85. Id. at 1078.

in the reversal, on appeal, of an order granting an injunction. 86 The
employer's receipt of unwanted and unnecessary services, should it
prevail at arbitration, has been mentioned as a reason for denying injunctive relief.8 7 When an injunction against the transfer of employees pending the arbitration of a seniority dispute would have disrupted the employer's ability to provide efficient and effective services to customers, the
balance was similarly tipped in the employer's favor.88 While substantial
monetary losses that an employer would sustain should an injunction

issue are not in themselves sufficient to warrant the denial of relief to a
union, such expenses will be considered as a factor favoring refusal of an
injunction.8 9 These potential pecuniary losses of the employer should be
compensable by the bonds required of the union when injunctive relief is
granted. 90
86. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Typographical Union No. 18,471 F.2d 872
(6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973).
87. Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 9 v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 343 F. Supp.
55, 56 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1973).
88. Communications Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 430 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
89. Hoh v. Pepsico, 491 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir. 1974); Local 120, UAW v. Seagrave
Div., F.W.D. Corp., 56 L.R.R.M. 2874, 2876 (E.D. Ohio 1964).
90. When preliminary injunctions are issued, a bond is usually required to make whole
any wrongfully restrained party. See Dobbs, Should Security Be Required as a Pre-condition
to Provisional Injunction Relief?, 52 N.C. L. REV. 1091 (1974); Metzger & Friedlander,
supra note 28, at 913. The bonds set by some courts are often insufficient to compensate
adequately a wrongfully restrained employer. See Local 13, Int'l Fed'n of Prof. & Techn.
Engineers v. General Elec. Co., 90 L.R.R.M. 2566, 2571 (E.D. Pa. 1975) ($500 bond), rev'd
on other grounds, 531 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir. 1976); Food Employees Union, Local 590 v.
National Tea Co., 346 F. Supp. 875, 885 (W.D. Pa.), remanded, 474 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1972)
($25,000 bond when employer's sale of 36 stores, which jeopardized the jobs of 351
employees, was enjoined pending arbitration). Some courts have also required only nominal
bonds when employers seek to enjoin strikes. See Axelrod, supra note 50, at 943-45.
Whether the injunction bonds set by the courts include an amount to reflect reasonable
attorney's fees is not always evident from the decisions. Attorney's fees must be included in
a bond pursuant to § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 107(e) (1970). The Ninth
Circuit has held § 7 applicable when a union seeks an injunction pending arbitration. Transit
Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir.), vacated
and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976). Other circuits have not been clear on this point. The
Fourth Circuit apparently does not consider § 7 applicable, for it ruled that an injunction
bond was properly posted in accordance with FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c), which does not require
the inclusion of attorneys' fees. See Lever Bros. Co. v. Chemical Workers Union, Local
217, 554 F.2d 115, 120 (4th Cir. 1976). The Second and Sixth Circuits have held some of the
other procedural mandates of § 7 of Norris-LaGuardia applicable, but have not addressed
whether attorney's fees must be included in the bond. See Hoh v. Pepsico, 491 F.2d 556, 560
(2d Cir. 1974); Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Typographical Union No. 18, 471
F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973). See also Newspaper Printing
Pressmen's Union No. 9 v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 479 F.2d 607, 611 (3d Cir. 1973).
It is also unclear when the injunction bond becomes payable. Liability on the bond is
sometimes conditioned by lower courts upon the outcome on the merits in arbitration. See
Technical, Office & Prof. Workers Union, Local 757 v. Budd Co., 345 F. Supp. 42, 46-47
(E.D. Pa. 1972); United Steelworkers v. Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach; Inc., 319 F.
Supp. 636, 641-42 (W.D. Pa. 1970). The courts of appeal ruling on the issue have held that
the bond is payable only if the court erred in its factual determinations or in its determination of the arbitrability of the dispute. See Lever Bros. Co. v. Chemical Workers Union,
Local 217, 554 F.2d 115, 120-21 (4th Cir. 1976); Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976);
United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483, 488-89 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923
(1972) (employer suit to enjoin strike).

Often the union's delays in invoking or proceeding to arbitration will
counterbalance the hardship that may befall its members if an injunction
does not issue pending arbitration of the dispute. 9' The reaction of courts

to procedural delays by unions, however, has been mixed.92 This judicial
reaction is understandable because the delays might not have been occasioned by a strategy93to obtain through an injunctive order what might be
denied at arbitration.
2.

Some Other Considerations.-In addition to the losses in prod-

uctivity and efficiency that could result from a delay in the implementation of a managerial decision, 94 a preliminary injunction pending arbitration conflicts with the established manner in which a collective bargaining agreement is administered. 95 Unless they are bargained away, man91. See Hoh v. Pepsico, 491 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1974) "[M]ost significantly, the unions'
case was lacking in equity because of their failure effectively to invoke arbitration remedies
readily available to them." Id. at 561-62; accord, Distillery Workers, Local I v. Hiram
Walker, Inc., 88 L.R.R.M. 3127 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 90 L.R.R.M. 2889 (2d Cir. 1975).
92. In Technical, Office & Prof. Workers Union, Local 757 v. Budd Co., 345 F.
Supp. 42 (E.D. Pa. 1972), the union did not challenge the employer's right to relocate certain
corporate functions by filing a grievance until over three months after it had been notified of
the reorganization. The union then delayed arbitration of the dispute by unilaterally cancelling a grievance meeting required by the contract before grievance-arbitration could
commence. Nevertheless, the court granted the injunction. It mentioned that it was "not
endorsing the procedural delay which the Union occasioned." Id. at 47. The court also
stated that the doctrine of laches could be considered when a preliminary injunction pending
arbitration was sought. Id.
93. An injunction affords relief as complete as could be had in arbitration for the
duration of the injunctive order. It may be more desirable to obtain an injunction than
proceed expeditiously to arbitration, particularly if a frivolous contractual claim is involved.
This potential abuse was noted in Hoh v. Pepsico, 491 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1974). The court
stated,
We fail to perceive what equitable principle would justify a court giving these
unions, by way of preliminary injunction, a remedy they could have had by
arbitration if their position was justified, but which they chose not to seek until two
days before the date set for the shutdown and then not by the expedited procedure
to which the parties had agreed.
Id. at 562.
Other courts have limited the duration of the injunctive order, apparently to counter the
injunction's effect of removinq the incentive to arbitrate. The union can only lose by
proceeding promptly to arbitration when an injunction has been granted pending arbitration,
rather than for a fixed time period. See, e.g., Technical, Office & Prof. Workers Union,
Local 757 v. Budd Co., 345 F. Supp. 42, 48 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The employer's incentive to
delay arbitration when an injunction is denied and expedited arbitration of the dispute is
ordered has also been considered. See Communications Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 430
F. Supp. 969, 981 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
94. It is the core of our social order that decision-making is effective in direct
proportion to its proximity to the affected event. Presumably, the conduct sought
to be enjoined was pursued because that party saw more profit in that course of
conduct then in any other. It is the special genius of a capitalistic structure that
such judgments are not likely to be negatived by the central government.
Metzger & Friedlander, supra note 28, at 917. See note 77 supra.
95. The industrial agreement serves as a device by which at least some of the
rules which would otherwise be established unilaterally by management are jointly
established. . . . Implicit in these rules is the essential characteristic of the industrial agreement: an acceptance of the authoritarian nature of the employment
relationship. The rules contained in it are standards against which management's
actions are to be measured, but management retains the right to act, to manage the
business and direct the working forces.
Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 663,
737 (1973).

agement retains the rights to the first interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement 96 and to "act in the first instance. " 97 A managerial
decision that a chosen course of action is more efficient and profitable is
superseded by judicial opinion. Arguably, considerations of profit might
motivate conscious disregard of the labor agreement. This is unlikely,
however, considering the economic interdependence of the parties. 9" It is

doubtful that management would not consider in its cost calculus the
back-pay and retroactive seniority and fringe benefits that an arbitrator
could award to wrongfully terminated or laid-off employees.'

IV.
A.

Considerations of Labor Policy and the Greyhound HI Approach
The Contractual Quid Pro Quo Analysis
The Boys Markets decision dealt with the specific enforcement of an

express promise not to strike when the dispute is subject to arbitration. 10
Courts that consider the Boys Markets decision applicable to a union
action for injunctive relief pending arbitration equate any substantive
provision of the labor agreement that has allegedly been breached with

the promise not to strike over arbitrable grievances. In effect, every
limitation imposed by the labor agreement upon the employer's right to

manage its operations has become, by implication, the quid pro quo for
the no-strike provision."'0 It is doubtful that an employer, in promising to

arbitrate disputes, intended to subject its interpretation of the agreement
to arbitral review, if challenged by a grievance, before it could be
implemented. 102 By restraining employers pending arbitration when this
is unnecessary to effect the agreement to arbitrate, courts have been

96. It is management's right to administer the collective agreement, subject only to
challenge through the contractually mandated adjudicative procedure when a breach of the
agreement is alleged. Id. at 738-39.
97. Id.at 738.
98. Flagrant violation of the collective bargaining agreement would probably induce a
strike. In some cases the employer agreed to maintain the status quo for a set time period or
stipulated to some other arrangement after the union's action was instituted. See Hoh v.
Pepsico, 491 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir. 1974) (stipulation not to dismantle plant, or sell it except
to a person who would continue operations temporarily); Branch 352, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter
Carriers, 88 L.R.R.M. 2678, 2679 (S.D. Iowa 1975) (agreement by employer not to implement changes before hearing on the preliminary injunction); Local 294, Elec. Radio &
Mach. Workers Union v. Three Rivers Indus., Inc., 78 L.R.R.M. 2090 (D. Mass. 1971)
(stipulation maintaining the status quo for sixty days).
99. See note 73 supra.
100. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See
notes 20 and 22 supra.
101. It is unsound to assume that whenever the employer's right to manage unilaterally
has been limited by a provision of the labor agreement, the restriction was obtained "in
exchange for" a commitment not to strike. "When a union sues to compel arbitration of an
employee grievance, or to compel compliance with an arbitration award. . . it is suing for
specific performance of the only liability which the employer has agreed to assume." Feller,
note 95 supra, at 792-93.
102. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 411 (1976) (dictum)
(employer seeking injunction against a sympathy strike).

enforcing a promise never made by the employer and a right not intended
3
by either party. 10
The opinion in Transit Union, Division 1384 v. Greyhound Lines,
Inc. (GreyhoundI) 1'rejected the view that" [c]ourts should recognize a

contractual obligation, presumed by national labor policy, requiring an
employer temporarily to forego the expected benefits of actions causing
harm to the union or its members." 0 5 Instead, the court focused on the
scope of the promises contained in the labor agreement.106 The Ninth

Circuit's Greyhound HI decision recognizes that the employer's promise
to arbitrate disputes is, in the absence of an express promise to preserve
the status quo pending arbitration, no more than an undertaking to subject
managerial decisions to subsequent review and/or modification through
arbitration. The court held that when there is neither an express nor

implied promise by the employer to maintain the status quo, an injunction
to preserve it pending arbitration cannot be issued. 10o
A promise to maintain the status quo would be implied when such a
duty would be "essential to carry out promises to arbitrate and to

implement the private arrangements for the administration of the
contract.""' This approach is obviously more restrictive than the "ir-

reparable injury as a significant requirement" standard enunciated in
Greyhound I. ' No basis was found for implying a promise to preserve
103. A commitment to arbitrate all disputes arising under a collective agreement has
been held, under a quid pro quo analysis, to give rise to an implied promise not to strike.
Invoking the Boys Markets exception to Norris-LaGuardia, the Supreme Court in Gateway
Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), to effectuate the arbitration provision of a collective
agreement, sustained an injunction against a strike on the basis of an implied no-strike
obligation. The limits of permissible injunctive relief are properly marked by the applicability of the arbitration policy rationale under a quid pro quo analysis.
104. 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 127 (1977). The case was reheard,
although the arbitrator had already ruled for Greyhound, under the "capable of repetition,
yet evading review" exception to the mootness doctrine. Id. at 1238 n. 1;accord, Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 9 v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 479 F.2d 607, 609 n. I (3d Cir.
1973).
105. Simon, supra note 26, at 337.
106. An undertaking to preserve the status quo pending arbitration would be to
Greyhound what an undertaking not to strike would be to a union. The promisee
of each undertaking would obtain its benefits in exchange for a consideration
furnished by it. In this case . . . the Union's promise to submit the dispute to
arbitration, and not to strike could not have been given in exchange for an express
promise by Greyhound to preserve the status quo because no such promise was
made.
550 F.2d at 1238.
A question posed but not resolved by Greyhound H is whether it is the province of the
court, or the arbitrator to interpret a status quo provision. Cases predating Greyhound H are
not clear on this point. The court in Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 9 v.
Pittsburgh Press Co., 479 F.2d 607, 609 (3d Cir. 1973), did not reach the issue of who should
interpret status quo clauses. InDetroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Typographical Union
No. 18, 471 F.2d 872, 875 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973), the court found
that it was not the district court's prerogative to construe the status quo clause, but also
stated that "we do not hold that an injunction could never issue under a 'status quo'
provision." Id. at 877.
107. 550 F.2d at 1239.
108. Id. (quoting Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397,411 (1976)).
109. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.

the status quo under the Greyhound H approach, because "the arbitration
of the dispute will be unaffected by

.

.

. alteration of the status quo.""'

The court also recognized that it would be unnecessary to imply a promise
to maintain the status quo when any adversely affected employees could
be "restored substantially to the status quo
ante" should the employer
t
"be wrong in its position in arbitration.""'
B.

Considerationof Express or Implied Status Quo Provisions in Light

of Equitable Principles
It is not clear whether use of the equity safeguards is still required
when an express or implied promise to preserve the status quo pending
grievance resolution is found. The Greyhound I decision offers no
guidance on this point. Arguably, an injunction should issue to maintain
the status quo whenever there is an express promise by the employer to
preserve it pending arbitration. According to this view the courts would
construe only the scope of the status quo provision in determining
whether an injunction should issue to restrain an alleged breach. " 2 Under
these circumstances a court would be granting specific enforcement of an
obligation freely assumed and effectuating the intent of Taft-Hartley to
make the promises contained in a collective bargaining agreement judicially enforceable. 1'3 Whether an alleged breach of a status quo provision
would be sufficient for injunctive relief or whether the dispute underlying
the alleged breach must be arbitrable might be a point of contention. A
status quo provision, by its own terms, is not breached unless the
underlying dispute is arbitrable. 114 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit had
held earlier in Greyhound 1lt5 that the provisions of section 7 of NorrisLaGuardia,11 6 requiring a showing of irreparable injury and the balancing
110. 550 F.2d at 1239. See notes 81-85 and accompanying text supra.
111. 550 F.2d at 1239. The result reached in a case such as United Steelworkers v.
Blaw-Knox Foundry & Mill Mach. Inc., 319 F. Supp. 636 (W.D. Pa. 1970), would be the
same under an application of the Greyhound II analysis. See notes 57-59 and accompanying
text supra.
112. The courts could employ a presumption similar to that used to determine arbitrability. See note 41 supra. Absent an express exclusion of the dispute from coverage under
the arbitration provisions, a change in the status quo pending arbitration of an otherwise
arbitrable dispute might be enjoined.
113. "Statutory recognition of the collective bargaining agreement as a valid, binding,
and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong. 1st
Sess., 17 (1947).
114. A strict application of Buffalo Forge would require that the dispute underlying the
breach of the status quo provision be arbitrable. For example, an employer's transfer of
work would on its face violate a status quo provision by which the employer promised not to
implement any decision that is challenged through the grievance arbitration provisions of the
labor agreement. Nevertheless, if the arbitration provision of the agreement expressly
excluded from its coverage any disputes arising from the employer's transfer of work, the
transfer could not be enjoined. In a circumstance such as this, injunctive relief could not be
justified on the basis of the policy favoring the arbitration of labor disputes. Of course, an
employer could not obtain an injunction against a strike in protest over the transfer of work.
See notes 20-25 and accompanying text supra.
115. 529 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 807 (1976).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970).

of injuries in favor of the party seeking relief, were applicable to proceedsought a preliminary injunction under section 301
ings in which a union
17
of Taft-Hartley.
The better reasoned position would require the application of the
section 7 provisions or general equitable principles to determine the
propriety of injunctive relief. 118 Any implementation of a managerial
decision would alter the status quo to some degree. Despite the existence
of a status quo provision in the labor agreement, it is conceivable that
irreparable injury might not be inflicted upon employees adversely affected by an employer's actions and that greater injury could be inflicted
upon the employer by the issuance of an injunction. Cases predating
Greyhound Ii, in which unions sought preliminary injunctions when the
collective bargaining agreement contained a status quo provision, offer
some support for this position. 119
The circumstances in which an implied promise by the employer
would be found under Greyhound H substantially parallel those in which
irreparable injury would be found under an equity approach focusing on
20
the effect of the employer's action on the arbitration of the dispute.'
Regardless of this overlap, it does not necessarily follow that injunctive
relief should automatically issue. The balance of hardships must be
considered, although it is difficult to conceive of a circumstance in which
an implied promise to preserve the status quo would be found and
injunctive relief would not be proper. 12'
117. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). See also Hoh v. Pepsico, 491 F.2d 556, 560 (2d Cir. 1974);
Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Typographical Union No. 18, 471 F.2d 872, 876-77
(6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973).
118. Under Boys Markets, equitable principles must still be considered despite a
contractual no-strike provision. See note 22 supra. It has been asserted, however, that the
consideration of equitable principles is "perfunctory" when employers seek Boys Markets
injunctions against strikes in violation of a no-strike provision. See Axelrod, note 50 supra,
at 937.
119. In Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 9 v. Pittsburgh Press Co., 479 F.2d
607 (3d Cir. 1973), the court affirmed the lower court's denial of injunctive relief on the
ground that a likelihood of irreparable harm had not been shown despite the existence of a
status quo provision in the collective agreement. The court in Detroit Newspaper Publishers
Ass'n v. Typographical Union No. 18, 471 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
967 (1973), reversed the lower court's issuance of a preliminary injunction when the labor
agreement contained a status quo clause, because the lower court had made a conclusory
finding of irreparable harm and had failed to balance the injuries in granting the injunction.
See N.Y. Mailers Union, No. 6 v. New York News Inc., 81 L.R.R.M. 2590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1972), in which the court denied an injunction pending arbitration because of a failure to
demonstrate irreparable harm if the injunction did not issue, despite a status quo provision.
Contra, N.Y. Mailers Union No. 6 v. New York News Inc., 76 L.R.R.M. 2619 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1971). holding that the same status quo provision justified the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
120. Under this type of equity approach, irreparable injury would be found when the
remedy in arbitration would be clearly inadequate or the employer's action in implementing
the challenged decision Would have the effect of frustrating the arbitration of the dispute.
121. In Lever Bros. Co. v. Chemical Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115(4th Cir.
1976), the court reconsidered its decision in light of Greyhound II and reaffirmed it,
apparently on the basis that there was an implied promise by the employer to maintain the
status quo pending arbitration. Id. at 122-23. Ultimately, it did not matter whether the

C.

The Implications for Collective Bargaining

Although Greyhound H raises a number of unresolved questions, it
more thoroughly considers the role of the collective bargaining agreement
as well as the policy favoring the arbitration of labor disputes than any of
the decisions preceding it. The Greyhound H analysis is better suited to
the labor-management context than an approach assuming that injunctions are always in aid of arbitration. Greyhound H reduces the risk of
restraining a contractually permissible action and precludes judicial invocation of the policy of favoring arbitration over the principle of freedom
of contract. The decision recognizes that the policy favoring arbitration
does not require that injunctions should automatically issue after a summary analysis of the equity safeguards. Because GreyhoundHis controlling law only in the Ninth Circuit, the decision is unlikely to have any
widespread effect on the collective bargaining process. This is regrettable, because the decision provides an incentive for contractual, rather
than judicial, determination of the intent and priorities of the parties to a
labor agreement.
Boys Markets provided "an impetus for broader arbitration clauses
and for more careful consideration and draftsmanship of areas formerly
,,122 It has been asserted that the
resisted at the [bargaining] table ....
Buffalo Forge decision will also affect contract negotiations. 123 Requiring a status quo provision before an employer's action could be enjoined
pending arbitration would be likely to affect contract negotiations also.
This requirement would be desirable to avoid shifting the balance of
power established by the collective bargaining agreement through recourse to the courts when judicial intervention is not necessary to effec24
tuate the employer's promise to arbitrate disputes. 1
Access to preliminary injunctive relief should not be facilitated
merely because "draftsmen of collective bargaining agreements frequently utilize deliberately ambiguous language to mask actual disagreement,
anticipating subsequent resort to arbitration." 125 Courts should not encourage unions to rely on such purposefully drafted ambiguities as a
contractual interpretation of the union or the employer prevailed, because under either
contractual provision, the employer was entitled to terminate plant operations. Id. at 118-20.
The only effect of restraining the employer was to delay its move. In such a situation, it is
conceivable that the balance of hardships could be found to tip in the employer's favor if the
delay were costly or otherwise burdensome.
122. Rabin, Limitations on Employer Independent Action, 27 VAND. L. REv. 133, 181
(1974).
123. Aaron, Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1975-76 Term, [1976] LAB.
REL. Y.B. (DNA) 78, 91, suggests that Buffalo Forge "will . . .compel a revision of nostrike provisions in collective agreements so as specifically to include sympathy strikes
within their coverage." But see Curtin, supra note 24, at 80, noting that a strict application
of Buffalo Forge would allow an injunction to issue only when the strike is over an
arbitrable grievance, even if the contract expressly prohibits sympathy strikes.
124. See note 23 supra.
125. Simon, supra note 26, at 334.

source for arbitrable grievances, which grievances, in turn, provide the
basis for seeking preliminary injunctive relief. 126 Judicial approval of

such a stratagem results in a union obtaining, at least temporarily, what it
could not obtain through the agreement, and what it might not obtain
through arbitration.' 27 Additionally, it might hamper an employer's ability to respond to external business conditions. The policy favoring the
arbitration of labor disputes does not require this much.

The arbitration process will not, however, lose its value if a promise
to maintain the status quo pending arbitration is implied when an employer's action would either render its promise to arbitrate illusory or evade
the arbitrator's remedial powers. By denying injunctive relief when it

neither enforces an obligation freely assumed nor protects the process of
arbitration, the GreyhoundI1 decision shifts the responsibility for initially
defining their priorities, rights, and obligations to the parties who entered

into a labor agreement.
V.

Alternatives to Injunctive Relief

A.

The Federal Courts

If a court should find that some sanction against the employer is
appropriate pending arbitration, there are several options that are as
effective in protecting the employees against breaches of the collective
bargaining agreement as injunctive relief, yet not as harsh on the employer.' 28 In Local 120, UA W v. Seagrave Division, F. W.D. Corp. ,129 the
court conditioned the denial of injunctive relief upon the employer's
posting a bond to guarantee compensation to the employees and their

union should an arbitrator rule in their favor in a dispute about the
employer's contractual right to move its plant. The court in Communications Workers v. Western Electric Co. "0oconditioned the denial of relief
upon the employer's submission of the alleged violation of the seniority
126. See generally Sanders, Some Comments on Labor Dispute Settlement Processes,
27 VAND. L. REV. 5, 20 (1974). Requiring an express or implied promise to maintain the
status quo would preclude this practice. See note 82 supra.
127. See, e.g., Lever Bros. Co. v. Chemical Workers Union, Local 217, 554 F.2d 115
(4th Cir. 1976), and the award of the arbitrator, Lever Bros. Co., 65 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl.
1299 (1976) (Edes, Arb.) (holding for employer); See also note 142 infra.
128. An arbitrator is presumed capable of restoring the status quo and, therefore,
injunctive relief is inappropriate when an arbitrator's award is adequate. See notes 60-70, 73
supra. See generally Mogge v. District 8, IAM, 454 F.2d 510, 514-15 (7th Cir. 1971); Texas
Gas & Transmission Corp. v. Chemical Workers Union No. 187, 200 F. Supp. 521, 528
(W.D. La. 1961).
Illustrative of the arbitrator's remedial power is Selb Mfg. Co. v. IAM, Dist. No. 9, 305
F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1962), in which case the court affirmed the judgment of the lower court
giving specific enforcement of the arbitrator's award in favor of the union. The employer
was compelled to return to its St. Louis, Missouri plants the machinery, equipment, and
work it had transferred to its plants in Arkansas and Colorado and to recall all of the St.
Louis employees laid off as a result of the wrongful transfer of work. The employer was to
reinstate them without loss of seniority or pay, thus restoring the status quo.
129. 56 L.R.R.M. 2874, 2876 (E.D. Ohio 1964) ($400,000 bond).
130. 430 F. Supp. 969, 980-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

provisions to expedited arbitration. This permitted the adjudication of the
union's claim before any of its members lost their seniority rights under
the labor agreement. 3 ' A denial of injunctive relief might also be conditioned upon the employer's waiver of the pre-arbitration grievance procedures to expedite arbitration and upon waiver of all contractual limitations
upon the arbitrator's authority to fashion a remedy.' 32 "The range of
judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the
33
problem. "1
B.

The State Public Employer-Employee Cases

Recently a number of cases have arisen in the public sector in which
injunctions were sought pending the arbitration of a dispute. Unlike the
federal courts, state courts dealing with requests for preliminary injunctive relief have employed a traditional equity analysis without focusing
upon-the degree to which the equity criteria
must be modified because of
34
the national policy favoring arbitration.'

The public sector cases have generally arisen when employees have
been either laid-off or terminated. In Armitage v. Carey, 135 the bargaining representative for the employees had obtained an injunction restraining the New York Department of Transportation from terminating the
employment of some of its members pending arbitral determination of
whether the employee security provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement had been violated. The court reversed the grant of the injunction by the lower court as an improvident exercise of discretion, noting
that the loss of employment did not threaten irreparable harm since the
employees would be entitled to their former positions, with back pay, if
they should prevail in arbitration.'

36

Moreover, there had been no show-

131. Id. at 979-80.
132. It is noted in F. ELKOURI & E. A. ELKOURI, supra note 1, that a submission
agreement by the parties may be used "[t]o expand or diminish the authority of the
arbitrator more than provided by the collective agreement." Id. at 185.
133. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
134. The Public Employee Relations Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon 1977), requires mandatory binding arbitration of disputes or
grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement with a public employee union. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated,
"This policy is even stronger than that embodied in federal labor policy." Board of Educ. v.
Federation of Teachers Local No. 3, 464 Pa. 92, 99, 346 A.2d 35, 39 (1975). Nevertheless,
the only Pennsylvania case in which a written opinion was filed, Council 13, AFSCME v.
Shapp, 1508 C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 2, 1977) (order granting preliminary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 77-99 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Aug. 3, 1977) (dismissed as moot Oct. 27,
1977). did not mention that the policy of favoring arbitration was relevant to the issuance of
the injunction. The preliminary injunction never took effect because under PA. R.A.P.
1736(b) the Commonwealth's appeal operated as an automatic supersedeas. See note 142
infra.
135. 49 App. Div. 2d 496, 375 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1975).
136. The court relied on two earlier decisions, Cohen v. Department of Soc. Serv., 37
App. Div. 2d 626, 323 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 571, 330 N.Y.S.2d 789, 281
N.E.2d 839 (1972) and DeLury v. City of New York, 48 App. Div. 2d 595, 378 N.Y.S.2d 49
(1975). Both held that when any wrongfully terminated employees could be fully compen-

ing that any action taken by the employer "would have the effect 37of
usurping the jurisdiction of the arbitrator in the grievance procedure." 1
Recently, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania was faced with
a number of suits for preliminary injunctive relief pending arbitration
1 38
because of the anticipated furloughing (lay-off) of state employees.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously held, in a case arguably
analogous, that injunctive relief was improper when a terminated civil
service employee had an adequate administrative remedy. 139 The
Commonwealth Court cases have not, however, been uniform. Judge
of the cases,14 while Judge
Blatt issued preliminary injunctions in 1two
41
Mencer denied injunctive relief in one.
Apparently Pennsylvania is an exception to the general rule that state
courts, in public employer-employee cases, take a more restrictive approach to enjoining the implementation of managerial decisions pending
arbitration than do the federal courts. Two of the Pennsylvania cases
strongly suggest that preliminary injunctive relief pending arbitration
could be sought to obtain what could not be secured through contract
42
negotiations or to placate present and attract potential union members. 1
sated by the payment of back salaries and a restoration of their old positions as of the date of
termination, there was no demonstration of irreparable damage.
137. 49 App. Div. 2d at 498-99, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 901; accord, Coster v. Department of
Personnel, 36 Md. App. 523, 373 A.2d 1287, 1290 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
138. Joint Bargaining Comm. v. Commonwealth, 1421 C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Aug. 19, 1977) (request for preliminary injunction denied); Council 13, AFSCME v. Shapp,
1508 C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 2, 1977) (order granting preliminary injunction),
appeal docketed, No. 77-99 (Pa. Sup. Ct., Aug. 3, 1977) (dismissed as moot Oct. 27, 1977);
Mansour v. Beal, 1454 C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct. filed July 19, 1977); Federation State
Cult. Educ. Prof. v. Commonwealth, 1347 C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct. filed July 11, 1977)
(withdrawn by agreement to arbitrate July 26, 1977); AFSCME v. Commonwealth, 1022
C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct., May 20, 1977) (order granting preliminary injunction).
The only prior Pennsylvania decision on injunctions restraining an employer pending
arbitration was rendered by a lower court in an action brought by teachers to enjoin an
increase in their recess supervision responsibilities. Bristol Twp. Educ. Ass'n v. Bristol
Twp. Bd. School Directors, 55 Pa. D. & C.2d 605 (C.P. Bucks Co. 1972) (denying injunction
for failure to make a showing of "irremediable harm").
139. Berkowitz v. Wilbar, 416 Pa. 369, 206 A.2d 280 (1965). The federal courts also
strictly interpret the requirements for injunctive relief when a preliminary injunction is
sought pending an administrative hearing to determine the propriety of terminating federal
government employment. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974); Morgan v.
Fletcher, 518 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1975); Soldevila v. Secretary of Agriculture, 512 F.2d 427
(1st Cir. 1975).
140. Council 13, AFSCME v. Shapp, 1508 C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 2, 1977),
appeal docketed, No. 77-99 (Pa. Sup. Ct., Aug. 3, 1977) (dismissed as moot Oct. 27, 1977);
AFSCME v. Commonwealth, 1022 C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct., May 20, 1977).
141. Joint Bargaining Comm. v. Commonwealth, 1421 C.D. 1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
Aug. 19, 1977).
142. Id. (preliminary injunction denied); Council 13, AFSCME v. Shapp, 1508 C.D.
1977 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Aug. 2, 1977) (order granting preliminary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 77-99 (Pa. Sup. Ct., Aug. 3, 1977) (dismissed as moot Oct. 27, 1977).
In Council 13, AFSCME v. Shapp, 1508 C.D. 1977, the neutral arbitrator ruled for the
Commonwealth. Opinion of the Impartial Chairman, Case No. 77-1311 (Aug. 26, 1977)
(Howard, Arb.). The arbitration panel, with the union member dissenting, rejected the
union's position that article XXX, § 7(e) of the agreement between AFSCME and the
Commonwealth required the Commonwealth to provide Council 13 with detailed informa-

The federal courts that have decided injunction cases may have been so
sensitized to favoring arbitration that in attempting to accommodate this
policy they disregarded the apparent basis for such suits when the integrity of the arbitration process was not threatened-the union's need to
enhance its image in the eyes of its membership.1 43 A union may find it
necessary to respond to what is apparently drastic conduct by the employer, whether the employer's action in implementing a managerial decision
is in breach of the collective agreement or not, to preserve the expectations of its membership. ' This is a consideration that the courts should
45
not overlook when they consider the propriety of injunctive relief. 1
Conclusion
The cases in which preliminary injunctions have been sought to
restrain employers pending the arbitration of labor disputes demonstrate
VI.

that this is a narrow but significant area of labor law that remains largely
unstructured. In part, this is a result of the discretionary nature of
equitable relief. It is also, however, a function of the lack of specific
guidelines governing the issuance of preliminary injunctions in this type
of action and of the Supreme Court's broad policy statements about
arbitration. Precedent can be adduced supporting either party to an action
for a preliminary injunction pending arbitration, regardless of whether the
relief sought is necessary to effectuate the agreement to arbitrate or to
protect the process of arbitration.'"
tion. The agreement required only notice to the union one month in advance of an impending
furlough. The neutral arbitrator concluded,
Had the parties intended to provide for [the requested] information, it would have
been a simple matter to include the provision of specific information in the
language in question, as the parties did [in other sections] . . . it is highly significant that the Union's demand in the 1976 negotiations for specific information was
rejected by the Commonwealth.
Opinion of the Impartial Chairman, Case 77-1311 at 7.
While injunctive relief was denied in Joint Bargaining Comm. v. Commonwealth, 1421
C.D. 1977, Judge Mencer ordered expedited arbitration. The expedited arbitration was later
indefinitely continued on motion of the union. These cases strongly suggest that applications
for injunctive relief are not necessarily occasioned by the inadequacy of arbitration.
143. See, e.g., Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. Typographical Union No. 18,
471 F.2d 872, 877 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967 (1973), in which the union
asserted that the irreparable injury threatened was not the loss of overtime to the employees, but the "appearance to its members that the Union is helpless to discharge its obligations . . . and that this loss of confidence of the members would be irreparable."
144. See note 76 supra.
145. It is possible that courts have tacitly recognized the need for union response to a
managerial decision which, if implemented, would threaten employee job security. This may
explain why courts have enjoined employers when the arbitral remedy was clearly adequate.
See note 74 supra.
146. For example, in National Ass'n Letter Carriers, Branch 352 v. United States
Postal Serv., 88 L.R.R.M. 2678 (S.D. Iowa 1975), the employer's elimination of a ten minute
wash-up time was enjoined pending arbitration. The court in Local 174, Util. Workers
Union v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 345 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Pa. 1972), however, refused to
enjoin the employer's alleged denial of a meal period and clean-up time on extended
overtime work periods on the ground that there was no demonstration of harm that could not
be remedied through arbitration.

An action to enjoin an employer pending arbitration is not the
converse of a Boys Markets case in which an employer seeks to. enjoin a
strike over a dispute covered by the grievance-arbitration provisions of
the labor agreement. The Greyhound HI decision demonstrates a judicial
awareness that labor law does not become symmetrical by treating the
two actions the same.
The need for judicial intervention in labor-management disputes
through independent actions for preliminary injunctions restraining employers pending arbitration is largely illusory. The national policy favoring the arbitration of labor disputes can be properly invoked to justify
these injunctions only when the employer's action would undermine its
agreement to arbitrate or render any subsequent arbitral award in favor of
the union or employees nugatory. When an employer's action in implementing a managerial decision prior to arbitration would not have either
of these effects, a preliminary injunction should not be granted. Under
these circumstances it could easily become a judicial award of what could
not be achieved through collective bargaining. Moreover, the issuance of
injunctive relief might deprive management of the flexibility needed to
adapt its operations to changed conditions in a competitive economy.
Increased access to injunctive relief has uncertain implications for
managerial efficiency and for the collective bargaining process. The
present practice of extending prior directives of the Supreme Court to
actions in which a union seeks injunctive relief to preserve the status
quo has produced unsatisfactory results. The contradiction and confusion
among the courts reveal that earlier decisions have provided inadequate
direction in this area of labor law. Lincoln Mills and the Steelworkers
trilogy established the primacy of arbitration for labor dispute settlement.
The Boys Markets decision further implemented this policy. Buffalo
Forge147 set the bounds within which the arbitration policy rationale
could be employed legitimately when an employer seeks to enjoin a strike
in breach of contract. Whether the Buffalo Forge decision marks a trend
toward more limited access to preliminary injunctions for both labor and
management remains to be seen. Regrettably, the Supreme Court has not
directly confronted the issues presented by actions to enjoin employers
pending arbitration.
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147. Courts have interpreted and applied Buffalo Forge differently. The court in Lever
Bros. Co. v. Chemical Workers Union, Local 217,554 F.2d 115 (4th Cir. 1976), believed that
Buffalo Forge was primarily concerned with avoiding judicial determination of the merits of
a labor dispute when the merits were properly for an arbitrator's consideration. In
Communications Workers v. Western Elec. Co., 430 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the
court narrowly construed Buffalo Forge as standing only for the proposition that Boys
Markets injunctions were not available in sympathy strike situations.

